Did you know that Denmark sold Tibet's historical status as a sovereign state and the Tibetan people's right to struggle for freedom from Chinese rule at the beginning of the COP 15 meetings (on December 9) to appease China, in the hopes that China will behave like a responsible superpower? [Denmark is not the only country that has sold Tibet. Last year England issued a similar statement.] So what did China do during the COP 15 negotiations? An insider at a crucial meeting of two dozen heads of states, Mr. Mark Lynas, blames China for the failure of the COP 15 summit. I was most startled to read this:
"It was China's representative who insisted that industrialised country targets, previously agreed as an 80% cut by 2050, be taken out of the deal. "Why can't we even mention our own targets?" demanded a furious Angela Merkel. Australia's prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil's representative too pointed out the illogicality of China's position. Why should rich countries not announce even this unilateral cut? The Chinese delegate said no, and I watched, aghast, as Merkel threw up her hands in despair and conceded the point."
While I don't believe in everything noted by Mr. Mark Lynas, his conclusion about China's game plan makes sense: "China wants to weaken the climate regulation regime now 'in order to avoid the risk that it might be called on to be more ambitious in a few years' time'."
I have been to several international environmental conferences, including IUCN 2000, IUCN 2004 and WSSD 2002, and I have seen with my own eyes how these negotiations work, especially at the UN level. You get to see basic world politics in operation. World politics, by the way, are different from international politics, which again are different from global politics. By basic world politics in action, I mean that states quickly get grouped into the politics of "developed countries" versus "developing countries." Issues of global politics, such as human rights, poverty reduction, environmental protection and women's empowerment will get hijacked under international (between key states) and world (developed vs. developing states) politics.
What is interesting is the level of world politics that operates at these conferences: it's so basic! The developed versus developing countries politics is so 80's and it still dominates these meetings. While I definitely came across undercurrents of deeper layers of world politics, such as the aspirations of the 53-member African states and the Muslim bloc, these don't come up in an articulate and forceful way. These, somehow, get subsumed under the larger 'developing versus developed countries' politics. The African and Muslim blocks, for example, are generally happy to vote "No" to anything that the developed countries, usually headed by the U.S., put forward. And China is really good at taking advantage of this situation.
What is even more interesting is how the vastly different developing countries, from major powers like India and Brazil to climate-vulnerable states like Maldives and Bangladesh, allow China, which is so much more powerful and has completely different sets of interests, take the lead in these negotiations. Amazing, really. Will China advocate for the interest of countries like Maldives? Read an observation by Mr. Lynas:
"With the deal gutted, the heads of state session concluded with a final battle as the Chinese delegate insisted on removing the 1.5C target so beloved of the small island states and low-lying nations who have most to lose from rising seas. President Nasheed of the Maldives, supported by Brown, fought valiantly to save this crucial number. "How can you ask my country to go extinct?" demanded Nasheed. The Chinese delegate feigned great offence – and the number stayed, but surrounded by language which makes it all but meaningless. The deed was done."
So there, Denmark sacrificed Tibet on the altar of a global environmental issue, but to no avail. With the lessons learned, does Denmark have the integrity to acknowledge its mistakes and retract the statement?
Read more on this article...
Can you tell the name of this flower?
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Yes, can you please tell me the English or botanical name of this flower? Apparently this flower is quite popular among the Tibetans. Its Tibetan name is Dolma Metok (སྒྲོལ་མ་མེ་ཏོག༑).
I like how these flowers are planted in used paper packets and old rusty tins. This white Dolma Metok is planted in a Amul milk packet. Amul dairy products are a favorite of exile Tibetans. [Amul, by the way, has an interesting story behind its inception as a farmers' cooperative society in the Indian state of Gujarat.] This photo was taken at Mussoorie's Tibetan temple and these flowers belong to an older monk, whose name I don't know. Tibetans are quite ingenious about their flower pots. My mother has a couple of begonia (Chuzin Metok) plants in broken thermos cases. My friend Tsering Chophel, in Clementown Dhondupling Settlement, has, for example, cut empty plastic jars into halves and made two flower pots, one with the lid on, of each plastic jar!
Gen Tamding-la, of Tibetan Homes School, told me how they used to take care of Dolma Metok. Apparently this is a perennial flower. Winters in Tibet are cold, so they keep the flowers indoor during night and they take it outside in the morning when the sun rises. Dolma metok is a special "ornament" of Losar (Tibetan new year) decoration. Interestingly, the white flowers have a nice subtle scent, which the red ones don't seem to have. Dolma metok also comes in yellow and other colours.
Here (above) is a close-up photo of Dolma Metok. Even the red ones on the back is Dolma Metok.
The older lama's flower collection overlooking the Himalayas. He has many kinds of geranium (Trung Trung Metok) and marigolds (Serchen Metok).
This (above) daisy-like flower is actually chrysanthemum. Now, there are many Tibetan names for chrysanthemum such as Khenpa (འཁན་པ་), Lugmig (ལུག་མིག་) and Drangsong (དྲང་སྲོང་). Khenpa is the most commonly used name. Lugmig is the name used in Tibetan medicine, I think, so I should consult an expert on Tibetan medicinal plant names about this. And Drangsong, which means old sage or ascetic in Tibetan, is a specific kind of chrysanthemum. Drangsong metoks have fluffier blossoms with longer petals, see below.
If you wish to learn Tibetan flower names, see this post. I would love to hear from readers about flower names. Please share.
Read more on this article...
I like how these flowers are planted in used paper packets and old rusty tins. This white Dolma Metok is planted in a Amul milk packet. Amul dairy products are a favorite of exile Tibetans. [Amul, by the way, has an interesting story behind its inception as a farmers' cooperative society in the Indian state of Gujarat.] This photo was taken at Mussoorie's Tibetan temple and these flowers belong to an older monk, whose name I don't know. Tibetans are quite ingenious about their flower pots. My mother has a couple of begonia (Chuzin Metok) plants in broken thermos cases. My friend Tsering Chophel, in Clementown Dhondupling Settlement, has, for example, cut empty plastic jars into halves and made two flower pots, one with the lid on, of each plastic jar!
Gen Tamding-la, of Tibetan Homes School, told me how they used to take care of Dolma Metok. Apparently this is a perennial flower. Winters in Tibet are cold, so they keep the flowers indoor during night and they take it outside in the morning when the sun rises. Dolma metok is a special "ornament" of Losar (Tibetan new year) decoration. Interestingly, the white flowers have a nice subtle scent, which the red ones don't seem to have. Dolma metok also comes in yellow and other colours.
Here (above) is a close-up photo of Dolma Metok. Even the red ones on the back is Dolma Metok.
The older lama's flower collection overlooking the Himalayas. He has many kinds of geranium (Trung Trung Metok) and marigolds (Serchen Metok).
This (above) daisy-like flower is actually chrysanthemum. Now, there are many Tibetan names for chrysanthemum such as Khenpa (འཁན་པ་), Lugmig (ལུག་མིག་) and Drangsong (དྲང་སྲོང་). Khenpa is the most commonly used name. Lugmig is the name used in Tibetan medicine, I think, so I should consult an expert on Tibetan medicinal plant names about this. And Drangsong, which means old sage or ascetic in Tibetan, is a specific kind of chrysanthemum. Drangsong metoks have fluffier blossoms with longer petals, see below.
If you wish to learn Tibetan flower names, see this post. I would love to hear from readers about flower names. Please share.
Read more on this article...
Woser's article on "Tibet's Water Pollution and China's 'Global Warming'" on HPPE
There is a really good Chinese language article on pollution of Lhasa River and problems associated with mining at Gyama village of Meldro Gungkar county by Woser, the premier Tibetan blogger. You can read an English translation of the article by High Peaks Pure Earth. Check out the striking photographic evidences of the problems with water pollution and mining in the region.
The Gyama mine is now owned by a Canadian company named Jinshan. I have written about human rights implications and Canada's involvement in these projects. See: Canada and Crime Against the Tibetan People
Read more on this article...
The Gyama mine is now owned by a Canadian company named Jinshan. I have written about human rights implications and Canada's involvement in these projects. See: Canada and Crime Against the Tibetan People
Read more on this article...
Dams on Machu/Yellow River/Huanghe (Northeast Tibetan Plateau)
Friday, December 18, 2009
I am pleased to publish this map of hydropower projects on the upper Yellow River known as Machu (᪵ᨋᩛᨋ) [རྨ་ཆུ་] in Tibetan and Huanghe in Chinese. Many thanks to my amazing map maker and to all others, especially Bruce Lee, who have provided us information and corrective feedback. If you find the following map of dams in Northeast Tibetan Plateau of interest, check out related maps of the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau as well. We are working on more maps, so please stay tuned.
For the sake of simplicity and accuracy a project's Status has only four possible values: Built/Operational, Under Construction, Under Active Consideration, and Proposed. The term "Built" includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. "Under Construction" indicates that work is proceeding on the ground and does not necessary entail that the river has been blocked or diverted. "Under Active Consideration" includes those HPPs that are those projects which the design, environmental issues, financing etc. are being developed as well as those that have been discussed but have never made it to the drawing board in any serious way. "Cancelled" includes only those projects for which there is widespread agreement that the government has decided that the proposed projects will not go ahead. This does not mean that a similar project may not be in the works to get around of the cancellation of the original project.
Capacity is given in Megawatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources. Power generation capacity of hydropower generators is developing quickly so they may change.
Information shared here are obtained from the Northwest Hydro Consulting Engineers, CHECC, a Qinghai government website, and a number of other web based resources. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information.
The maps are only approximately to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.
Read more on this article...
For the sake of simplicity and accuracy a project's Status has only four possible values: Built/Operational, Under Construction, Under Active Consideration, and Proposed. The term "Built" includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. "Under Construction" indicates that work is proceeding on the ground and does not necessary entail that the river has been blocked or diverted. "Under Active Consideration" includes those HPPs that are those projects which the design, environmental issues, financing etc. are being developed as well as those that have been discussed but have never made it to the drawing board in any serious way. "Cancelled" includes only those projects for which there is widespread agreement that the government has decided that the proposed projects will not go ahead. This does not mean that a similar project may not be in the works to get around of the cancellation of the original project.
Capacity is given in Megawatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources. Power generation capacity of hydropower generators is developing quickly so they may change.
Information shared here are obtained from the Northwest Hydro Consulting Engineers, CHECC, a Qinghai government website, and a number of other web based resources. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information.
The maps are only approximately to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.
Read more on this article...
COP 15, China and Tibet
Another quick post to recommend an article by Ma Jun, director of Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs based in Beijing. I like the way Ma Jun has described the problem of the COP 15 agreement deadlock between developed and developing countries as having to do with issues of efficiency and equity. It is also always refreshing to hear reasonable Chinese or Tibetan (where are they?) voices that move environmental issues beyond the confines of national politics to the global level.
One may argue that Tibetan environmental issues must be seen within the context of the Chinese political economy and the historical context of their rule in TIbet. Agreed. In fact I argue further that finding solutions--i.e., reversing adverse Chinese development policies and practices in Tibet--would require working with Chinese environmental leaders. Talking about Tibet's environmental problems to the world, via Western media and supporters, will not reverse disturbing trends such as excessive damming of rivers or displacement of nomads. Tibetans working with Chinese environmentalists like Ma Jun, however, may start the incremental steps necessary to ameliorate these disturbing trends within the Chinese political economy.
I came to know about Ma Jun's work nearly ten years ago when he was an environmental journalist trying to get his book on China's Water Crisis translated/published in English. I was a fresh graduate student then at the Hatfield School of Government in Portland, Oregon. I vividly remember watching Ma Jun's presentation on China's Water Crisis live online, which was telecast from the office of International Rivers in Berkeley. I even managed to ask him a question during the Q&A session. It was quite an experience. What struck me from this exchange, although I don't remember what we talked about, was his affable personality and his deep sense of commitment to deal with China's environmental problems, character traits I noticed in several other Chinese environmental leaders whom I came to know in the coming years. Unlike the Communist brainwashed and racist Chinese stereotype that I had heard so many times growing up in exile, Chinese environmental leaders I met, such as Wang Yongchen, Yu Xiaogang and Wen Bo are all extremely nice and open-minded people. Read more on this article...
One may argue that Tibetan environmental issues must be seen within the context of the Chinese political economy and the historical context of their rule in TIbet. Agreed. In fact I argue further that finding solutions--i.e., reversing adverse Chinese development policies and practices in Tibet--would require working with Chinese environmental leaders. Talking about Tibet's environmental problems to the world, via Western media and supporters, will not reverse disturbing trends such as excessive damming of rivers or displacement of nomads. Tibetans working with Chinese environmentalists like Ma Jun, however, may start the incremental steps necessary to ameliorate these disturbing trends within the Chinese political economy.
I came to know about Ma Jun's work nearly ten years ago when he was an environmental journalist trying to get his book on China's Water Crisis translated/published in English. I was a fresh graduate student then at the Hatfield School of Government in Portland, Oregon. I vividly remember watching Ma Jun's presentation on China's Water Crisis live online, which was telecast from the office of International Rivers in Berkeley. I even managed to ask him a question during the Q&A session. It was quite an experience. What struck me from this exchange, although I don't remember what we talked about, was his affable personality and his deep sense of commitment to deal with China's environmental problems, character traits I noticed in several other Chinese environmental leaders whom I came to know in the coming years. Unlike the Communist brainwashed and racist Chinese stereotype that I had heard so many times growing up in exile, Chinese environmental leaders I met, such as Wang Yongchen, Yu Xiaogang and Wen Bo are all extremely nice and open-minded people. Read more on this article...
"High Sanctuary" by Jamyang Norbu
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
A quick post to recommend a new article by Jamyang Norbu, winner of Crossword Book Award, India's equivalent of Booker Prize, on environmental conservation in historical Tibet.
Jamyang Norbu's blog provides informative and persuasive commentaries on Tibetan political struggle and history. The contents on this blog are mainly aimed at younger Tibetans and Tibet activists.
Read more on this article...
Jamyang Norbu's blog provides informative and persuasive commentaries on Tibetan political struggle and history. The contents on this blog are mainly aimed at younger Tibetans and Tibet activists.
Read more on this article...
Metok Dumra: a collection of common flower names
Saturday, November 28, 2009
In the past few months, I have spoken with many Tibetans to collect names of common flowers. Many elders and Tibetans from Tibet were delighted to engage in these conversations. Listening to them describe the colors, shapes and even the timing of different blossoms, it is clear that people in Tibet have great appreciation for flowers.
Exile Tibetans, however, can barely identify more than three or four flowers. Perhaps this is because traditional ecological knowledge is less relevant in foreign environments. Additionally, while names of vegetables, fruits and animals are taught in school textbooks, flower names are generally omitted. That exile Tibetans grow up not knowing flower names is unfortunate not only for loss of language but also for lacking appreciation for nature's most delightful gift--flowers. I hope this collection of flower names will help Tibetans, particularly children, identify flowers in their mother tongue.
I am grateful to all those who spoke to me about flowers, including Ugyen Tsephel-la for cross checking flower names, and to the many photographers who share photos through (flickr.com) the Creative Commons license. I trust the use of some of these photos in this educational video/booklet is permissible. The video's background music -- Vivaldi's Four Seasons, Spring: Allegro -- comes from the courtesy of youtube.
Here are some more flower names in Tibetan for which I would love to know their English names.
ᨨᨋ᪠ᩏᨋ
ᩍᨕᨋ᪱ᨋ
᪱ᩛᨋᨋ᪠ᨋ
ᨕᨋᨵᨋ
ᨳᨋᩲᨑᨵᨋ
ᩆ᪱
᪠ᫎᨋ
ᩧᨑᨋལུᩏ་
ᩜ᪱ᨋ᩶᪣ᩏᨋ
ᩂᨋ᪣᪱
ᨓ
ᩂᨋ᫄᪱᪄ᨋ᪄ᨋ᪱ᨋ
ᩘᩏᨋ᪱ᨋ
ᨋᩲᩏᨋ
ᨓ᪄ᨋ᩠ᩏᨋᨋ
ᨵᩏᨋᨋ
ᩖᨑ᪄ᨋ᪽ᨑᨋᨑᨋ (nasturcium? morning glory?)
ᨋᨡᨋ
A related post on flowers.
Read more on this article...
Exile Tibetans, however, can barely identify more than three or four flowers. Perhaps this is because traditional ecological knowledge is less relevant in foreign environments. Additionally, while names of vegetables, fruits and animals are taught in school textbooks, flower names are generally omitted. That exile Tibetans grow up not knowing flower names is unfortunate not only for loss of language but also for lacking appreciation for nature's most delightful gift--flowers. I hope this collection of flower names will help Tibetans, particularly children, identify flowers in their mother tongue.
I am grateful to all those who spoke to me about flowers, including Ugyen Tsephel-la for cross checking flower names, and to the many photographers who share photos through (flickr.com) the Creative Commons license. I trust the use of some of these photos in this educational video/booklet is permissible. The video's background music -- Vivaldi's Four Seasons, Spring: Allegro -- comes from the courtesy of youtube.
Here are some more flower names in Tibetan for which I would love to know their English names.
ᨨᨋ᪠ᩏᨋ
ᩍᨕᨋ᪱ᨋ
᪱ᩛᨋᨋ᪠ᨋ
ᨕᨋᨵᨋ
ᨳᨋᩲᨑᨵᨋ
ᩆ᪱
᪠ᫎᨋ
ᩧᨑᨋལུᩏ་
ᩜ᪱ᨋ᩶᪣ᩏᨋ
ᩂᨋ᪣᪱
ᨓ
ᩂᨋ᫄᪱᪄ᨋ᪄ᨋ᪱ᨋ
ᩘᩏᨋ᪱ᨋ
ᨋᩲᩏᨋ
ᨓ᪄ᨋ᩠ᩏᨋᨋ
ᨵᩏᨋᨋ
ᩖᨑ᪄ᨋ᪽ᨑᨋᨑᨋ (nasturcium? morning glory?)
ᨋᨡᨋ
A related post on flowers.
Read more on this article...
Updated* maps of dams: Eastern Tibet
*The maps on this blog, and the details, have been updated since it was first posted. Special thanks to Fan Xiao, the chief engineer of the Sichuan Geology and Mineral Bureau in Chengdu, for providing details on Minjiang dams. What follows is the most up to date publicly available information on hydropower projects in the region.
This is an update on maps I shared on this blog on Zungchu/Minjiang and Gyarong Ngulchu/Dadu rivers. Thanks to encouraging and informative feedback from Bruce Lee, Fan Xiao, Kevin Li, Stone Routes, and from Probe International researchers, the following maps and tables provide a unique and reliable information on dams on the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau.
For the sake of simplicity and accuracy a project's Status has only four possible values: Built, Under Construction, Planned/Proposed, and Cancelled. The term "Built" includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. "Under Construction" indicates that work is proceeding on the ground and does not necessary entail that the river has been blocked or diverted. "Planned/Proposed" includes those HPPs that are those projects which the design, environmental issues, financing etc. are being developed as well as those that have been discussed but have never made it to the drawing board in any serious way. "Cancelled" includes only those projects for which there is widespread agreement that the government has decided that the proposed projects will not go ahead. This does not mean that a similar project may not be in the works to get around of the cancellation of the original project.
Capacity is given in MegaWatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources. Power generation capacity of hydropower generators is developing quickly so they may change.
Height is given in meters and indicates the total height of the dam associated with the HPP.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Clean Development Mechanism (UNFCCC CDM) assisted projects have been included on the tributaries map for three reasons. One is simply that reliable information is available for them. A second reason is that they provide examples of the thousands of small HPPs built throughout China which may (or may not) have negative consequences to the environment or local residents. A third reason they are shown is that they are examples of where Carbon Trading funds are going, which means that the general public overseas are subsidizing these projects since the Carbon Credits bought are tax deductible in developed nations. The CDM reports are available on the internet and at the UNFCCC site. More information regards UNFCCC at Wikipedia.
GYARONG NGULCHU or DADU RIVER
MEGOE TSO and TIANWAN HE
Click on the image below for details on Gyarong Ngulchu and Tianwan He dams
Hydropower Project on Zungchu / Minjiang River
Dams on the tributaries of Zungchu/Minjiang
Click on image below for details on Zungchu/Minjiang dams
Sources of data presented here: websites of Probe International, UNFCCC, China Guodian Corp., and a number of other web based resources. Various Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information. The maps are only approximately to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A detailed professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.
Suggested reading on policy implications of these dam projects."
Read more on this article...
This is an update on maps I shared on this blog on Zungchu/Minjiang and Gyarong Ngulchu/Dadu rivers. Thanks to encouraging and informative feedback from Bruce Lee, Fan Xiao, Kevin Li, Stone Routes, and from Probe International researchers, the following maps and tables provide a unique and reliable information on dams on the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau.
For the sake of simplicity and accuracy a project's Status has only four possible values: Built, Under Construction, Planned/Proposed, and Cancelled. The term "Built" includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. "Under Construction" indicates that work is proceeding on the ground and does not necessary entail that the river has been blocked or diverted. "Planned/Proposed" includes those HPPs that are those projects which the design, environmental issues, financing etc. are being developed as well as those that have been discussed but have never made it to the drawing board in any serious way. "Cancelled" includes only those projects for which there is widespread agreement that the government has decided that the proposed projects will not go ahead. This does not mean that a similar project may not be in the works to get around of the cancellation of the original project.
Capacity is given in MegaWatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources. Power generation capacity of hydropower generators is developing quickly so they may change.
Height is given in meters and indicates the total height of the dam associated with the HPP.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Clean Development Mechanism (UNFCCC CDM) assisted projects have been included on the tributaries map for three reasons. One is simply that reliable information is available for them. A second reason is that they provide examples of the thousands of small HPPs built throughout China which may (or may not) have negative consequences to the environment or local residents. A third reason they are shown is that they are examples of where Carbon Trading funds are going, which means that the general public overseas are subsidizing these projects since the Carbon Credits bought are tax deductible in developed nations. The CDM reports are available on the internet and at the UNFCCC site. More information regards UNFCCC at Wikipedia.
GYARONG NGULCHU or DADU RIVER
MEGOE TSO and TIANWAN HE
Click on the image below for details on Gyarong Ngulchu and Tianwan He dams
Hydropower Project on Zungchu / Minjiang River
Dams on the tributaries of Zungchu/Minjiang
Click on image below for details on Zungchu/Minjiang dams
Sources of data presented here: websites of Probe International, UNFCCC, China Guodian Corp., and a number of other web based resources. Various Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information. The maps are only approximately to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A detailed professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.
Suggested reading on policy implications of these dam projects."
Read more on this article...
Indian media and misinformation on Chinese dam on the Brahmaputra
Monday, November 9, 2009
The Indian media has been discussing Tibet for the last two weeks. The visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang, a Tibetan region "disputed" between India and China, is a key story these days. The subject of this blog, however, is a different story. On 4th November 2009, India's Zee TV News reported that China is indeed building a dam on the Brahmaputra river. Satellite images from India's National Remote Sensing Agency were reported as shocking evidence of the dam construction activity.
Readers of the Tibetan Plateau Blog know that China's building of dam on the Brahmaputra (or Yarlung Tsangpo as it is known in Tibet) is old news. The construction of Zangmu Hydropower Project is openly reported in Chinese media for a long time. I blogged about this development as early as March 5, 2009. The Zee News report did not talk about the four other dam projects, which are planned on the Brahmaputra, just near the Zangmu project.
Another important point that the Indian media does not clarify is that the Zangmu dam, which is located on the upper-middle reaches of Brahmaputra, should not be confused with the controversial mega-hydropower project that may get built at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra, just near the point where the river enters Indian controlled territory. Much of the Indian and Bangladesh's hoopla over Chinese dams on the Brahmputra revolve around rumours of this latter mega-project.
Indian misunderstanding is further obscured by this image from the Great Bend area in the Zee TV News report. Print news materials are even worse. For example, this article completely confuses the two different projects as one.
To read my views about about the proposed mega project on the Great Bend, and a disturbing Indian view that India should quickly build some dams on the Brahmaputra to establish prior use claims over China, see this post.
Here is the youtube video of the Zee News story, followed by my rough English translation of the Hindi audio report:
Despite all the opposition from India, China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra river. India has found clear evidence that a dam is being built on the Brahmaputra River. As evident in satellite images released by National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), a dam is being built on the river. Trucks moving about 3 to 4 kilometers near the construction site have also been observed. NRSA has alerted the Indian government about these findings. This matter has been raised with China, according to India.
Zee News correspondent, Dilip Tiwari, is here with us with more information on this. It is clear again that China's intentions are not good, Dilip. Dilip, can you hear us? OK, we will speak with Dilip [if/when we can reach each other]. Let's report to you again that despite all the opposition expressed by India, China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra. Clear evidence has been found that a dam is being built on the Brahmaputra. As evident in satellite images released by National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), a dam is being built on the river.
And at this time, we have former Foreign "Sachiv" (representative?), Mr. Kamal Sabbal. Welcome to Zee News, Sabbal-ji, now that it is clear from the satellite images that China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra in full swing, what steps should India take? And how serious is this situation from the Indian point of view?
[Mr. Kamal Sabbal speaks over the phone:] "Right now, it may not be a serious issue as the Indian Prime Minister has said that this is a 'run-off-river' project, which does not have storage [water reservoir] and there will not be decrease in supply of water. However, this can get serious in the future since China has many major plans. One of their plans is to divert water from Brahmaputra to Northern China. If they undertake such a plan, then the consequences will be very serious. The thing is that, projects like this, develop slowly overtime. China has just started the work. If we don't speak to them properly, fail to ask for explanations, or fail to express our concerns, then these [projects] will develop further. So we should find out what their plans are. What are their short and medium term plans? And what effects will these have on us [India]? We should also realize that these projects will have tremendous impacts in Bangladesh. So we should also try to see if India and Bangladesh can jointly put pressure on China.
[News anchor:] How can India lay its concerns in front of China? What immediate steps should India take?
[Mr. Kamal Sabbal:] One, there should be [a joint] experts committee from both the countries to share data and to assess the impacts of the plans and projects. [You] see, if the projects don't have serious downstream impact, we cannot stop them. If water supply is indeed likely to decrease, and then there is the case of global warming and everyone is afraid that water supply will be reduced for everyone, from that perspective, it will become a very serious issue. So data-sharing is a very important point. And the third thing that we should do, with full force, is to undertake the [dam] projects on our [the Indian] side ... because if we keep talking, that these [Chinese] dams will impact us, and if we don't have any downstream projects of our own, our protests will not have much strength. However, if we have downstream projects, these [projects] will have impact over them (Chinese plans and projects), then our protests will also have more weight in international law and to the international community.
[News anchor:] Yes. It is necessary that the issue is taken up seriously by the Indian government. Thank you, Sibbal-ji, for talking to Zee News.
Read more on this article...
Readers of the Tibetan Plateau Blog know that China's building of dam on the Brahmaputra (or Yarlung Tsangpo as it is known in Tibet) is old news. The construction of Zangmu Hydropower Project is openly reported in Chinese media for a long time. I blogged about this development as early as March 5, 2009. The Zee News report did not talk about the four other dam projects, which are planned on the Brahmaputra, just near the Zangmu project.
Another important point that the Indian media does not clarify is that the Zangmu dam, which is located on the upper-middle reaches of Brahmaputra, should not be confused with the controversial mega-hydropower project that may get built at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra, just near the point where the river enters Indian controlled territory. Much of the Indian and Bangladesh's hoopla over Chinese dams on the Brahmputra revolve around rumours of this latter mega-project.
Indian misunderstanding is further obscured by this image from the Great Bend area in the Zee TV News report. Print news materials are even worse. For example, this article completely confuses the two different projects as one.To read my views about about the proposed mega project on the Great Bend, and a disturbing Indian view that India should quickly build some dams on the Brahmaputra to establish prior use claims over China, see this post.
Here is the youtube video of the Zee News story, followed by my rough English translation of the Hindi audio report:
Despite all the opposition from India, China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra river. India has found clear evidence that a dam is being built on the Brahmaputra River. As evident in satellite images released by National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), a dam is being built on the river. Trucks moving about 3 to 4 kilometers near the construction site have also been observed. NRSA has alerted the Indian government about these findings. This matter has been raised with China, according to India.
Zee News correspondent, Dilip Tiwari, is here with us with more information on this. It is clear again that China's intentions are not good, Dilip. Dilip, can you hear us? OK, we will speak with Dilip [if/when we can reach each other]. Let's report to you again that despite all the opposition expressed by India, China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra. Clear evidence has been found that a dam is being built on the Brahmaputra. As evident in satellite images released by National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), a dam is being built on the river.
And at this time, we have former Foreign "Sachiv" (representative?), Mr. Kamal Sabbal. Welcome to Zee News, Sabbal-ji, now that it is clear from the satellite images that China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra in full swing, what steps should India take? And how serious is this situation from the Indian point of view?
[Mr. Kamal Sabbal speaks over the phone:] "Right now, it may not be a serious issue as the Indian Prime Minister has said that this is a 'run-off-river' project, which does not have storage [water reservoir] and there will not be decrease in supply of water. However, this can get serious in the future since China has many major plans. One of their plans is to divert water from Brahmaputra to Northern China. If they undertake such a plan, then the consequences will be very serious. The thing is that, projects like this, develop slowly overtime. China has just started the work. If we don't speak to them properly, fail to ask for explanations, or fail to express our concerns, then these [projects] will develop further. So we should find out what their plans are. What are their short and medium term plans? And what effects will these have on us [India]? We should also realize that these projects will have tremendous impacts in Bangladesh. So we should also try to see if India and Bangladesh can jointly put pressure on China.
[News anchor:] How can India lay its concerns in front of China? What immediate steps should India take?
[Mr. Kamal Sabbal:] One, there should be [a joint] experts committee from both the countries to share data and to assess the impacts of the plans and projects. [You] see, if the projects don't have serious downstream impact, we cannot stop them. If water supply is indeed likely to decrease, and then there is the case of global warming and everyone is afraid that water supply will be reduced for everyone, from that perspective, it will become a very serious issue. So data-sharing is a very important point. And the third thing that we should do, with full force, is to undertake the [dam] projects on our [the Indian] side ... because if we keep talking, that these [Chinese] dams will impact us, and if we don't have any downstream projects of our own, our protests will not have much strength. However, if we have downstream projects, these [projects] will have impact over them (Chinese plans and projects), then our protests will also have more weight in international law and to the international community.
[News anchor:] Yes. It is necessary that the issue is taken up seriously by the Indian government. Thank you, Sibbal-ji, for talking to Zee News.
Read more on this article...
Zungchu: More on Dams in Eastern Tibet
Friday, November 6, 2009
[Note: Refer to this updated post]
This is in continuation to my last post to share maps and information on "hydropower projects on the eastern fringes of the Tibetan Plateau. Here is a relevant article on the policy implications of these dam projects."
The information on these two maps and the table on Zungchu and its tributaries has been obtained from the Probe International website and a number of other web based resources which served to verify or correct the main sources. Again, many thanks to my ghost map maker and Kevin Li who helped locate the HPPs. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information and the maps are only approxiamtely to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A detailed professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.
Read more on this article...
This is in continuation to my last post to share maps and information on "hydropower projects on the eastern fringes of the Tibetan Plateau. Here is a relevant article on the policy implications of these dam projects."
The information on these two maps and the table on Zungchu and its tributaries has been obtained from the Probe International website and a number of other web based resources which served to verify or correct the main sources. Again, many thanks to my ghost map maker and Kevin Li who helped locate the HPPs. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information and the maps are only approxiamtely to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A detailed professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.
Read more on this article...
Dams on Gyarong Ngulchu or Dadu River
[Note: Refer to this updated post]
This is a quick post to share a couple of maps which show hydropower projects on the eastern fringes of the Tibetan Plateau. As rivers on "mainland China" are dammed and diverted beyond recognition, Chinese dam builders and hydro-engineers are looking towards the Tibetan Plateau for more business. Owing to this trend, more and more dams are being built on the rivers of the eastern parts of the Tibetan Plateau, mainly in Western Sichuan or Kham region. You may read an article on the policy implications of these dam projects.
Information on these maps have been obtained from websites of the Probe International, China Guodian Corp, Tibet Justice Center, and a number of other web based resources which served to verify or correct the main sources. Many thanks to my ghost map maker and to Kevin Li for corrections and clarifications on the facts, and for detailed information on the Tianwanhe Cascade. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information and the maps are only approxiamtely to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate.
This first map shows dams on the Dadu River, known to Tibetans as Gyarong Gyalmo Ngulchu (རྒྱལ་རོང་རྒྱལ་མོ་རྔུལ་ཆུ་). Shown dam projects also include those downstream of the Tibetan Plateau to help researchers who may find locating different dam names on the river confusing. For more information on these hydropower projects, see the table at the end of this post.
This second map shows on two tributaries of Gyarong Ngulchu, Wasi River and Tianwan. The Megoe Tso dam project shown on this map became controversial due to opposition from local Tibetans, who consider the lake (also known as the Yeti Lake and Megucuo) as sacred.
Read more on this article...
This is a quick post to share a couple of maps which show hydropower projects on the eastern fringes of the Tibetan Plateau. As rivers on "mainland China" are dammed and diverted beyond recognition, Chinese dam builders and hydro-engineers are looking towards the Tibetan Plateau for more business. Owing to this trend, more and more dams are being built on the rivers of the eastern parts of the Tibetan Plateau, mainly in Western Sichuan or Kham region. You may read an article on the policy implications of these dam projects.
Information on these maps have been obtained from websites of the Probe International, China Guodian Corp, Tibet Justice Center, and a number of other web based resources which served to verify or correct the main sources. Many thanks to my ghost map maker and to Kevin Li for corrections and clarifications on the facts, and for detailed information on the Tianwanhe Cascade. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information and the maps are only approxiamtely to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate.
This first map shows dams on the Dadu River, known to Tibetans as Gyarong Gyalmo Ngulchu (རྒྱལ་རོང་རྒྱལ་མོ་རྔུལ་ཆུ་). Shown dam projects also include those downstream of the Tibetan Plateau to help researchers who may find locating different dam names on the river confusing. For more information on these hydropower projects, see the table at the end of this post.
This second map shows on two tributaries of Gyarong Ngulchu, Wasi River and Tianwan. The Megoe Tso dam project shown on this map became controversial due to opposition from local Tibetans, who consider the lake (also known as the Yeti Lake and Megucuo) as sacred.
Read more on this article...
Canada and Crime Against the Tibetan People
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, also known as the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, has made a statement on mining in Tibet on Sept 22-23, 2009, at a London roundtable discussion on Shethongmon mining project. Shethongmon is situated near the city of Shigatse in southern Tibet. The roundtable meeting was organized by TibetInfoNet, which is also a consultant for the Canadian company, Continental Minerals, which is investing in the project.
The CTA statement is clearly against any mining project in Tibet but it does not condemn or express the seriousness of these investments. Despite having its pleas and moral suasions repeatedly ignored by Canadian mining companies, the exile Tibetan leadership continues to engage in these discussions. For the purposes of this blog, I think it is better to highlight the injustice and crime that these mining projects perpetuate than to write about about these exchanges.
The CTA statement cites three major protests in Tibet in 2009 against mining projects (Bathang county in March, Ser Ngul Lo in Markham county in May, and Meldo Gungkar county in June). It does not mention that a protest actually also took place against the Shethongmon mining project on 19th June 2006. Soon after the protest, disciplinary officials of the Party started "education campaigns" about the benefits of the project among the farmers.
Local protests against mining in Tibet are not new. Farmers in Meldo Gungkar have been protesting against mining at least since 1991 (see chapter 6 of CTA's report, Tibet: Environment and Development Issues 2000). Even as recent as two months ago, there were reports of clashes between local Tibetans and Chinese miners at the Gyama mine site. And two weeks ago, this intensely disputed mine was bought by another Vancouver based company named Jinshan.
As usual, here's a question for you readers: How is Canada attracting such deals in Chinese controlled Tibet? Canada is the only Western country with significant investments in Tibet. Any informed person would tell you that such deals must include heavy corruption and deep connections with the Party.
As I write this, my thoughts go to people like Thupten Yeshi, a farmer from Meldro Gungkar who expressed opposition to mining in his ancestral lands. Thupten Yeshi has been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for opposing the Gyama mining project, which is now legally owned by a Canadian company. Here is a GuChuSum file photo of Thupten Yeshi. I wonder how many others are imprisoned or have mysteriously "disappeared" ...
I am not saying that all Tibetans are against mining. Apart from Tibetans profiting from Chinese rule, there are also some progressive and business minded Tibetans in exile as well. The issue is not mining. It is about how decisions are made, who gets the benefits and who the losers are.
Affected local Tibetans will probably be given some compensation in the case of Shethongmon mine, but the bulk of the profits go to the company and the Chinese government. About 200 to 300 million US dollars would be paid by the company from their net profit to the government as Corporation Tax (at 35 %), which is the international norm. The company's conservative estimate of the expected return rate is 2.5 times their capital investment. Issues of environmental pollution, jobs and training of workers, etc. are important and a Canadian company may do a better job on these issues than a Chinese company. However, these issues are only secondary to larger and more fundamental issues of politics and moral principles.
Despite their best efforts to ensure fair and lawful business, foreign companies mining in Tibet are engaging in a kind of legalized robbery. Stealing can be lawful when lawmakers are colonial masters. The application of principles of corporate social responsibility ought to first look at more fundamental questions such as "Who are the legitimate owners of Tibet's gold and other mineral resources?" "What are the rights of an indigenous people (or nation) to their land?" These are not academic or philosophical questions. Canadians need not look far but into their own constitution (Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act) for general guidance.
++++++++++++
For background information on Shethongmon project, visit Continental Minerals' website. TibetInfoNet has published some reports on the project which can be read here and here. There is a campaign against these projects lead by Students for a Free Tibet and Canada Tibet Committee. Visit their website.
Read more on this article...
The CTA statement is clearly against any mining project in Tibet but it does not condemn or express the seriousness of these investments. Despite having its pleas and moral suasions repeatedly ignored by Canadian mining companies, the exile Tibetan leadership continues to engage in these discussions. For the purposes of this blog, I think it is better to highlight the injustice and crime that these mining projects perpetuate than to write about about these exchanges.
The CTA statement cites three major protests in Tibet in 2009 against mining projects (Bathang county in March, Ser Ngul Lo in Markham county in May, and Meldo Gungkar county in June). It does not mention that a protest actually also took place against the Shethongmon mining project on 19th June 2006. Soon after the protest, disciplinary officials of the Party started "education campaigns" about the benefits of the project among the farmers.
Local protests against mining in Tibet are not new. Farmers in Meldo Gungkar have been protesting against mining at least since 1991 (see chapter 6 of CTA's report, Tibet: Environment and Development Issues 2000). Even as recent as two months ago, there were reports of clashes between local Tibetans and Chinese miners at the Gyama mine site. And two weeks ago, this intensely disputed mine was bought by another Vancouver based company named Jinshan.
As usual, here's a question for you readers: How is Canada attracting such deals in Chinese controlled Tibet? Canada is the only Western country with significant investments in Tibet. Any informed person would tell you that such deals must include heavy corruption and deep connections with the Party.
As I write this, my thoughts go to people like Thupten Yeshi, a farmer from Meldro Gungkar who expressed opposition to mining in his ancestral lands. Thupten Yeshi has been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for opposing the Gyama mining project, which is now legally owned by a Canadian company. Here is a GuChuSum file photo of Thupten Yeshi. I wonder how many others are imprisoned or have mysteriously "disappeared" ...
I am not saying that all Tibetans are against mining. Apart from Tibetans profiting from Chinese rule, there are also some progressive and business minded Tibetans in exile as well. The issue is not mining. It is about how decisions are made, who gets the benefits and who the losers are.
Affected local Tibetans will probably be given some compensation in the case of Shethongmon mine, but the bulk of the profits go to the company and the Chinese government. About 200 to 300 million US dollars would be paid by the company from their net profit to the government as Corporation Tax (at 35 %), which is the international norm. The company's conservative estimate of the expected return rate is 2.5 times their capital investment. Issues of environmental pollution, jobs and training of workers, etc. are important and a Canadian company may do a better job on these issues than a Chinese company. However, these issues are only secondary to larger and more fundamental issues of politics and moral principles.
Despite their best efforts to ensure fair and lawful business, foreign companies mining in Tibet are engaging in a kind of legalized robbery. Stealing can be lawful when lawmakers are colonial masters. The application of principles of corporate social responsibility ought to first look at more fundamental questions such as "Who are the legitimate owners of Tibet's gold and other mineral resources?" "What are the rights of an indigenous people (or nation) to their land?" These are not academic or philosophical questions. Canadians need not look far but into their own constitution (Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act) for general guidance.
++++++++++++
For background information on Shethongmon project, visit Continental Minerals' website. TibetInfoNet has published some reports on the project which can be read here and here. There is a campaign against these projects lead by Students for a Free Tibet and Canada Tibet Committee. Visit their website.
Read more on this article...
Dams on Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra): More Info
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
Thanks to 'Stone Routes' who just posted a comment on one of my posts about dams on Yarlung Tsangpo. It made me realize that I had forgotten to share further information about the five dams on the river (also called the Brahmaputra).
These five dams are Zangmu (རྫམ་ or dzam), Jiacha (རྒྱ་ཚ་ or Gyatsa), Zhongda (སྒྲོམ་མདའ་ or Zhomda) and Lengda (གླིང་མདའ་ or Lingda), and Jiexu and Langzhen. Only Zangmu project is being built right now and others are in the project pipeline. I am unable to find the original Tibetan names for Jiexu and Langzhen so far. If any of the readers know the Tibetan names, please let me know. I used the Tibetan & Himalayan Library to find the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of Zangmu (29.14 and 92.52), Gyatsa (29.11 and 92.71) and Lingda (29.07 and 92.72) townships. Here is a Google Earth image of the location of these five dam sites.
You can use the coordinates at the bottom of the image or the inverted 'V' shape of the river on the right hand corner of the image to navigate approximate locations. Better still if you have good internet connection to browse Google Earth online, you can use this link prepared by Kevin Li of the International Rivers Network.
Read more on this article...
These five dams are Zangmu (རྫམ་ or dzam), Jiacha (རྒྱ་ཚ་ or Gyatsa), Zhongda (སྒྲོམ་མདའ་ or Zhomda) and Lengda (གླིང་མདའ་ or Lingda), and Jiexu and Langzhen. Only Zangmu project is being built right now and others are in the project pipeline. I am unable to find the original Tibetan names for Jiexu and Langzhen so far. If any of the readers know the Tibetan names, please let me know. I used the Tibetan & Himalayan Library to find the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of Zangmu (29.14 and 92.52), Gyatsa (29.11 and 92.71) and Lingda (29.07 and 92.72) townships. Here is a Google Earth image of the location of these five dam sites.
You can use the coordinates at the bottom of the image or the inverted 'V' shape of the river on the right hand corner of the image to navigate approximate locations. Better still if you have good internet connection to browse Google Earth online, you can use this link prepared by Kevin Li of the International Rivers Network.
Read more on this article...
Doctored Google Earth Images: Is Google Helping China Falsify Information?
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
A dam located about 100 km NE of Lhasa, known as the Zhikhong Dam, is mysteriously vague in Google Earth (GE). A new high-resolution image in GE shows the area including the large reservoir, but the precise location of dam and power station is a low-resolution image, and the boundary between them is curved. It is possible to see strips of old images between new images in GE but in this case it fits the end of the reservoir exactly, and the boundary between the two images is curved, which is unusual.
A jpg image of the region taken from GE is posted here (below). I don't know how to upload kmz files or links that will take readers directly into Google Earth. So readers interested in looking up more closely should use the coordinates at the bottom of the image. Going up closer to the location in GE is much more convincing than the jpg photo shared here.
I told this observation to a friend and colleague from Green College, who used to work for Google Maps, the amazing Ducky. She checked the images and found them suspicious. Upon her advice, we decided to alert Google Earth about this and to see their response.
What do you think is going on here? Is Google Earth covering up for China? Or is someone supplying GE with doctored images? Or may be someone in Google Earth is working against company policies?
Did you know that a giant alian bug was found in a part of Germany in GE?
Read more on this article...
A jpg image of the region taken from GE is posted here (below). I don't know how to upload kmz files or links that will take readers directly into Google Earth. So readers interested in looking up more closely should use the coordinates at the bottom of the image. Going up closer to the location in GE is much more convincing than the jpg photo shared here.
I told this observation to a friend and colleague from Green College, who used to work for Google Maps, the amazing Ducky. She checked the images and found them suspicious. Upon her advice, we decided to alert Google Earth about this and to see their response.
What do you think is going on here? Is Google Earth covering up for China? Or is someone supplying GE with doctored images? Or may be someone in Google Earth is working against company policies?
Did you know that a giant alian bug was found in a part of Germany in GE?
Read more on this article...
"How life is for 'The urbanised nomads' "
Thursday, August 6, 2009
I came across a great website today: the Tibet Web Digest (བོད་ཀྱི་དྲ་གནས་ཕྱོགས་སྡུས༑). This website translates note worthy Tibetan language articles into English to "provide access to the vigorous intellectual and cultural activity of the Tibetan language cybersapce." I encourage you to visit this website as it contains many interesting posts, including the subject tile of my post today.
"How life is for 'The urbanised nomads' ” is a brief report on the condition of resettled Golok nomads from the Three Rivers Headwaters Nature Reserve. The writer shares data on the living condition, income level and experiences of the resettled nomads. The writer also recounts some of the interviews conducted at the relocation camp on April 14, 2007. The original Tibetan language article is currently inaccessible [At least two popular sites -- www.tibetabc.cn and www.tibettl.com -- are inaccessible right now].
If you want to read my older posts related to the topic of resettlement of nomads, see here.
Read more on this article...
"How life is for 'The urbanised nomads' ” is a brief report on the condition of resettled Golok nomads from the Three Rivers Headwaters Nature Reserve. The writer shares data on the living condition, income level and experiences of the resettled nomads. The writer also recounts some of the interviews conducted at the relocation camp on April 14, 2007. The original Tibetan language article is currently inaccessible [At least two popular sites -- www.tibetabc.cn and www.tibettl.com -- are inaccessible right now].
If you want to read my older posts related to the topic of resettlement of nomads, see here.
Read more on this article...
"Are the police allowed to fish?"
Sunday, July 26, 2009
A Tibetan blogger by the name "Ling Se Jur Tha" (གླིང་སྲས་བྱུར་མཐའ) reports fishing in the Zoege (Ch: Ruo’ergai) grasslands at the source of Machu (Yellow) River. The blog was posted on July 26, 2009. The blogger is reporting this incident because on the one hand the government claims protection of the Zoege Wetland as a nature reserve, while its own policemen, on the ground, are breaking the same law "with pride".
When independent media is absent, such citizen journalism deserves our close attention. If you read Tibetan, read the comments by readers on the original post . One of them suggests noting the vehicle number and reporting to higher authorities. Tibetans bloggers engaging in citizen journalism was first publicly identified by High Peaks Pure Earth.
A quick note on the importance of wetlands: Wetlands perform key roles in a river's hydrological cycle. During wet seasons when there is risk of flooding and high erosive activity due to increased flow in rivers, wetlands help reduce these risks by absorbing water like a sponge. The excess water is slowly released during dry season. Wetlands also filter sediments, chemicals and nutrients in groundwater.
I don't know what kind and quantity of fish are in the Zoege Wetlands but this area is known to bird lovers as a prime site for viewing migratory birds such as Black-necked Crane and Mongolian Plover.
Here is the translated post (in italics) with pictures.
Are the police allowed to fish?
This policeman is fishing in the vast Zoege grassland region (read the Tibetan language post for precise description of the location). I asked the policeman, "Can the police fish in the river?" He replied, "Of course," with pride.
Here he is, fishing. The laws and regulations of China are a joke.
This is his [police] car.
Read more on this article...
When independent media is absent, such citizen journalism deserves our close attention. If you read Tibetan, read the comments by readers on the original post . One of them suggests noting the vehicle number and reporting to higher authorities. Tibetans bloggers engaging in citizen journalism was first publicly identified by High Peaks Pure Earth.
A quick note on the importance of wetlands: Wetlands perform key roles in a river's hydrological cycle. During wet seasons when there is risk of flooding and high erosive activity due to increased flow in rivers, wetlands help reduce these risks by absorbing water like a sponge. The excess water is slowly released during dry season. Wetlands also filter sediments, chemicals and nutrients in groundwater.
I don't know what kind and quantity of fish are in the Zoege Wetlands but this area is known to bird lovers as a prime site for viewing migratory birds such as Black-necked Crane and Mongolian Plover.
Here is the translated post (in italics) with pictures.
Are the police allowed to fish?
This policeman is fishing in the vast Zoege grassland region (read the Tibetan language post for precise description of the location). I asked the policeman, "Can the police fish in the river?" He replied, "Of course," with pride.
Here he is, fishing. The laws and regulations of China are a joke.
This is his [police] car.
Read more on this article...
Tourism and Festivals in Tibet
Friday, July 17, 2009
I often hear from people wanting to visit Tibet. They usually want to know what places to visit, what to avoid, when is a good time, and if they could work with some local group as a volunteer. I think these are good questions. And then there are stupid, or should I just say, bad, questions.
Here is one of the bad questions people ask: what kind of things, such as pencils and photos of the Dalai Lama, should they take as gifts for Tibetans, especially for poor children. Giving gifts randomly is a bad idea, especially if it is something the government prohibits, such as pictures of the Dalai Lama. Giving candies, pencils, etc., randomly to children reminds me of throwing bread crumbs to fish in the lake, or to monkeys by the roadside. At parks here in Canada, I see signs restricting people from giving food to animals -- it habituates them, changing their normal way of life. Same thing, but only worse. Tibetans are humans! A friend said it quite well: Tourists should not demean children by treating them as beggars and coming across as a rich almsgiver.
If you are interested in visiting Tibet, read How Not To Be A Tourist in Tibet.
The inspiration for writing this blog actually came from reading this news piece. If you are able to decipher the statistics explained in the article with strange English, please explain in the comments section below. The gist of the article as I understand it is this: A lot of tourists are pouring into Tibet, much more than last year, especially from within China. The rise in the number of tourists is not surprising. The number of tourists last year dropped radically after the March 14 Uprising, and the martial law, and the shutting-off of the Tibetan Plateau, and all the sensitivities surrounding the Olympics.
What really got me thinking was the last sentence which is clearly meant to entice more tourists. I quote a section of the sentence: "in the second half year, more tourists will be attracted as some large-scale activities such as "Miss Asia" Tibet Division Contest, 4th Namtso International Hiking Convention and the annual Shoton Festival will kick off."
Miss Asia? Surely Miss Tibet should be invited. OK, I am being facetious here. But more seriously, it is deeply disturbing that the government promotes certain Tibetan festivals such as the Shoton because of their tourism prospects, while at the same time they tell Tibetans not to celebrate other festivals such as the Buddha Purnima, Sakadawa in Tibetan, the most sacred day for all Buddhists. The government has instructed Tibetans to celebrate Chinese (or is it Korean?) Dragon Boat Festival instead. I highly recommend a close reading of this blogpost by a Tibetan expressing his/her feelings about this in a clever way. Read the contextual introduction of the blogpost by High Peaks Pure Earth carefully as well, and you will know what I am talking about.
Read more on this article...
Here is one of the bad questions people ask: what kind of things, such as pencils and photos of the Dalai Lama, should they take as gifts for Tibetans, especially for poor children. Giving gifts randomly is a bad idea, especially if it is something the government prohibits, such as pictures of the Dalai Lama. Giving candies, pencils, etc., randomly to children reminds me of throwing bread crumbs to fish in the lake, or to monkeys by the roadside. At parks here in Canada, I see signs restricting people from giving food to animals -- it habituates them, changing their normal way of life. Same thing, but only worse. Tibetans are humans! A friend said it quite well: Tourists should not demean children by treating them as beggars and coming across as a rich almsgiver.
If you are interested in visiting Tibet, read How Not To Be A Tourist in Tibet.
The inspiration for writing this blog actually came from reading this news piece. If you are able to decipher the statistics explained in the article with strange English, please explain in the comments section below. The gist of the article as I understand it is this: A lot of tourists are pouring into Tibet, much more than last year, especially from within China. The rise in the number of tourists is not surprising. The number of tourists last year dropped radically after the March 14 Uprising, and the martial law, and the shutting-off of the Tibetan Plateau, and all the sensitivities surrounding the Olympics.
What really got me thinking was the last sentence which is clearly meant to entice more tourists. I quote a section of the sentence: "in the second half year, more tourists will be attracted as some large-scale activities such as "Miss Asia" Tibet Division Contest, 4th Namtso International Hiking Convention and the annual Shoton Festival will kick off."
Miss Asia? Surely Miss Tibet should be invited. OK, I am being facetious here. But more seriously, it is deeply disturbing that the government promotes certain Tibetan festivals such as the Shoton because of their tourism prospects, while at the same time they tell Tibetans not to celebrate other festivals such as the Buddha Purnima, Sakadawa in Tibetan, the most sacred day for all Buddhists. The government has instructed Tibetans to celebrate Chinese (or is it Korean?) Dragon Boat Festival instead. I highly recommend a close reading of this blogpost by a Tibetan expressing his/her feelings about this in a clever way. Read the contextual introduction of the blogpost by High Peaks Pure Earth carefully as well, and you will know what I am talking about.
Read more on this article...
New Map Throws Light on Tawu Protest and the Future of Eastern Tibet
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Recently it was reported that tens of thousands of Tibetans gathered in Tawu county of Kandze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture to protest against government issued relocation notice. The incident resulted in the police shooting at the protesters. The resettlement project, according to the report, is to make way for a major hydroelectric dam between Nyagchu and Tawu counties. In a previous blog post, I opined that the dam is the Lianghekou dam. The Lianghekou will be one of the world's tallest dams with a height nearly 300 meters. The dam will have a 6.33 billion cubic meter capacity reservoir that will extend 90 km from the dam up the Nyagchu River. A dam as big as the Lianghekou will most likely require relocation of thousands of farmers living along the river.
Unfortunately, Lianghekou is just one of the 21 dams built/planned on the Nyagchu River by the Ertan Hydropower Development Company. I write this blog to share the following copyright-free map of these dams.
I will not repeat what is clearly shown in the map. Click on the map to find out for yourself how these dams will change the face of eastern Tibet. This map is the most accurate publicly available document of its kind.
I like to share questions that I wonder about with readers. Here are three questions:
1. Where are most of the corruption happening with these projects, assuming corruption is endemic in the Chinese dam industry?
2. Where will most of the power generated from these dams be diverted? To the west for China's most ambitious copper mine/smelter, the Yulong, or to the east for Chinese cities?
3. What is the best way to raise awareness about the social and environmental costs of these projects within China?
Dams Planned, Under Construction, or Operated by Ertan Hydropower Development Company, Ltd. on the Nyagchu (Yalong River), Sichuan, PRC
There are currently 21 hydropower dam planned, under construction, or operated on the Nyagchu (Yalong River) by Ertan Hydropower Development Company, Ltd.. These are listed below and their locations shown on the map "Nyagchu/Yalong River: Dams Completed, Under Construction, and Planned by Ertan". The five categories are those given on the Ertan website and are most likely out of date. While the operational dams and dams under construction are still correct, it is possible that one or more of the dams said to be in the preparatory stage to be in fact more accurately characterized as under construction.
Location of Projects on the Map
The positions of the projects on the map have been estimated from the Ertan Cascade Projects Planning chart, several maps showing planned dams along the Nyagchu, a 1984 report on dams planned in the PRC by U.S. Department of Commerce which included a map and a cascade chart for all but one of the dams from Lainghekou south, and additional geographical information about the dams. The locations of projects from Lianghekou south have been confirmed by at least two sources as well as the Cascade Projects Planning chart. The distances up the river were also verified using the path option in Google Earth, which in a couple of cases was surprisingly accurate. The Ertan dam is visible in Google Earth image so coordinates are available for it. The map is not definitive (i.e. is not based on a exact coordinates verified on the ground), but is accurate for its scale, based on information currently publicly available. It corrects some of the maps which were used as sources, and is more accurate and complete than any we were able to find.
The following information are directly from the website of Ertan Hydropower Development Company.
Power Station in Operation
Ertan
The Ertan website states "Ertan Hydropower Station is China’s largest hydropower station completed in the 20th century. Construction of Ertan Power Station created several “No. Ones” in China and in the world, which are:
No. ones in China:
1. China’s first high dam exceeding 200m.
2. China’s largest group of underground caverns and tunnels (also the largest in Asia).
3. China’s largest power plant built in the 20th century (with a total capacity of 3,300MW).
4. China’s largest unit capacity of 550MW, realizing a big leap from 335MW to 550MW.
5. China’s first hydropower project fully open for international competitive bidding.
No. ones in the world:
1. A project for which the World Bank provided the largest loan as a single project.
2. The total load of 980 tonnes taken by the dam and the designed spillway capacity of 22,480 m3/s are the largest among high dams in the world.
3. The cross section of the diversion tunnels (23m high by 17.5m wide) is the largest in the world."
Projects Under Construction
Jinping I
Located in the counties of Yanyuan and Muli, Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its large reservoir makes it a controlling project in the lower reach of the main river. Jinping-I is huge in scale, and power generation is its main purpose. The project has a total installed capacity of 3,600MW (6 × 600MW). Its total storage capacity is 7.76 billion m3, and with a regulation storage of 4.91 billion m3, it is a storage capacity is 7.76 billion m3, and with a regulation storage of 4.91 billion m3. The project consists of permanent structures categorized as water retaining, spillway and dissipation, and power tunnels and powerhouse complex. Its 305m-high double curvature concrete arch dam is one of the world’s highest dams. Total construction period of the project is 9 years and 3 months, and its total static investment is RMB19.68 billion yuan, while the total dynamic investment is RMB24.58 billion yuan.
Jinping II
Located on the large Jinping River Bend, and is the second of the five cascade projects on the river section from Kala down to the estuary. Jinping-II is designed to cut the 150km river bend by a group of power tunnels to use the natural drop created by the bend. The project primarily consists of a headwork sluice dam, spillway structures, power tunnels and powerhouse complex. The dam is 7.5km downstream of Jinping-I dam. Jinping-II reservoir itself only has a capacity of daily regulation, but when jointly operated with Jinping-I, it also has the capacity of yearly regulation. The 4 power tunnels have an average length of 16.6km and an excavated diameter of 13m, which are among the world’s longest and largest hydraulic tunnels. The powerhouse complex sits underground on the other side of the river bend. The project has a total installed capacity of 4,800MW (8 × 600MW), which gives a multiyear average annual generation of 24.23TWh. Total construction period of the project is 8 years and 3 months, and its total static investment is RMB24.98 billion yuan, while the total dynamic investment is RMB29.77 billion yuan.
Projects in Preparatory Stage
Guandi
Situated 30 km from Xichang City in straight line and 80 km by road. It is the third of the five cascade projects on the river section from Kala to the estuary, and connects with the downstream Ertan Project. The main purpose of Guandi Project is power generation, and its total installed capacity is 2400MW. With the maximum height of the dam being 168m. The reservoir has a total storage of 760 million cubic meters. The complex mainly consists of a RCC (roller compacted concrete) gravity dam, an underground powerhouse on the right bank, and spillway facilities. Its total static investment is RMB12.49 billion yuan, while the total dynamic investment is RMB15.2 billion yuan.
Tongzilin
Situated in Yanbian County of Panzhihua municipality, Sichuan Province, 18km to its upstream Ertan Dam and 15km to the confluence of the Yalong and Jinsha rivers. It is the last cascade project on the Yalong River. The total installed capacity of the project is 600MW (4×150MW). The complex consists of the water-retaining dam sections on both sides, a river-bed type powerhouse, and spillway structures. The maximum dam height is 66.63m, and the length of the dam crest is 468.7m."
Lianghekou
Situated in Yajiang County of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. The project sits where the Yalong merges respectively with the Qingda and Xianshui rivers, hence the name “lianghekou” (meaning “estuary of two rivers”). Because of its particular location with one dam blocking three rivers, and because of its large reservoir, this project is truly a controlling project in the middle and lower reaches of the Yalong. The reservoir, with a regulation storage of 6.33 billion cubic meters, has the capacity of multi-year regulation, and will therefore provide good compensation for all its downstream cascade power stations on the Yalong and even on the Jinsha and Yangtze. The total installed capacity of the project is 3,000MW. The project has favorable development conditions, and will play an important role in improvement of the power source structure of Sichuan power grid, optimization of power source configuration, and fulfillment of the strategy of West-to-East transmission of electric energy. It is a strategic fulfillment of the strategy of West-to-East transmission of electric energy. It is a strategic project for hydroelectric development of the Yalong River and even the whole West, and for coordinated socioeconomic development.
Projects in Investigation Stage
The Ertan website states "The middle reach river section, from Lianghekou to Kala, is 268km long. According to the approved planning, there are six projects in this section of the river, namely Lianghekou (3,000MW), Yagen (1,400MW), Lenggu (2,718MW), Mengdigou (1,840MW), Yangfanggou (1,500MW), and Kala (1,080MW), with a total capacity of approximately 11.54GW. Of these projects, Lianghekou has a large controlling reservoir.
Yagen Hydroelectric Project Yagen Hydroelectric Project is located in Yajiang County of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,400MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 6,368GWh. The expected static investment is about 9.64 billion yuan.
Lenggu Hydroelectric Project Lenggu Hydroelectric Project is located in Kangding and Yajiang counties of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 2,718MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 12,570GWh. The expected static investment is about 22.25 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process.
Mengdigou Hydroelectric Project Mengdigou Hydroelectric Project is located in Jiulong County of Ganzi Prefecture and Muli County of Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,840MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 9,070GWh. The expected static investment is about 12.62 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process.
Yangfanggou Hydroelectric Project Yangfanggou Hydroelectric Project is located in Muli County of Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,500MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 7,05GWh. The expected static investment is about 10.77 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process.
Kala Hydroelectric Project Kala Hydroelectric Project is located in Muli County of Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,080MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 5,24GWh. The expected static investment is about 9.0 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process."
Projects in Planning Stage
The Ertan website states, "The upper reach of the river, from Jiayisi to Lianghekou, is 688km long, and development planning for this section is underway. Based on the investigation data obtained to date, 10 cascade projects with a total installed capacity of 3,250MW are intended to be built, which are Wenbosi (150MW), Renqingling (300MW),Reba (250MW), Ada (250MW), Geni (200MW), Tongha (200MW), Yingda (500MW), Xinlong (500MW), Gongke (400MW), and Gongbagou (500MW)."
Read more on this article...
Unfortunately, Lianghekou is just one of the 21 dams built/planned on the Nyagchu River by the Ertan Hydropower Development Company. I write this blog to share the following copyright-free map of these dams.
I will not repeat what is clearly shown in the map. Click on the map to find out for yourself how these dams will change the face of eastern Tibet. This map is the most accurate publicly available document of its kind.
I like to share questions that I wonder about with readers. Here are three questions:
1. Where are most of the corruption happening with these projects, assuming corruption is endemic in the Chinese dam industry?
2. Where will most of the power generated from these dams be diverted? To the west for China's most ambitious copper mine/smelter, the Yulong, or to the east for Chinese cities?
3. What is the best way to raise awareness about the social and environmental costs of these projects within China?
Dams Planned, Under Construction, or Operated by Ertan Hydropower Development Company, Ltd. on the Nyagchu (Yalong River), Sichuan, PRC
There are currently 21 hydropower dam planned, under construction, or operated on the Nyagchu (Yalong River) by Ertan Hydropower Development Company, Ltd.. These are listed below and their locations shown on the map "Nyagchu/Yalong River: Dams Completed, Under Construction, and Planned by Ertan". The five categories are those given on the Ertan website and are most likely out of date. While the operational dams and dams under construction are still correct, it is possible that one or more of the dams said to be in the preparatory stage to be in fact more accurately characterized as under construction.
Location of Projects on the Map
The positions of the projects on the map have been estimated from the Ertan Cascade Projects Planning chart, several maps showing planned dams along the Nyagchu, a 1984 report on dams planned in the PRC by U.S. Department of Commerce which included a map and a cascade chart for all but one of the dams from Lainghekou south, and additional geographical information about the dams. The locations of projects from Lianghekou south have been confirmed by at least two sources as well as the Cascade Projects Planning chart. The distances up the river were also verified using the path option in Google Earth, which in a couple of cases was surprisingly accurate. The Ertan dam is visible in Google Earth image so coordinates are available for it. The map is not definitive (i.e. is not based on a exact coordinates verified on the ground), but is accurate for its scale, based on information currently publicly available. It corrects some of the maps which were used as sources, and is more accurate and complete than any we were able to find.
The following information are directly from the website of Ertan Hydropower Development Company.
Power Station in Operation
Ertan
The Ertan website states "Ertan Hydropower Station is China’s largest hydropower station completed in the 20th century. Construction of Ertan Power Station created several “No. Ones” in China and in the world, which are:
No. ones in China:
1. China’s first high dam exceeding 200m.
2. China’s largest group of underground caverns and tunnels (also the largest in Asia).
3. China’s largest power plant built in the 20th century (with a total capacity of 3,300MW).
4. China’s largest unit capacity of 550MW, realizing a big leap from 335MW to 550MW.
5. China’s first hydropower project fully open for international competitive bidding.
No. ones in the world:
1. A project for which the World Bank provided the largest loan as a single project.
2. The total load of 980 tonnes taken by the dam and the designed spillway capacity of 22,480 m3/s are the largest among high dams in the world.
3. The cross section of the diversion tunnels (23m high by 17.5m wide) is the largest in the world."
Projects Under Construction
Jinping I
Located in the counties of Yanyuan and Muli, Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its large reservoir makes it a controlling project in the lower reach of the main river. Jinping-I is huge in scale, and power generation is its main purpose. The project has a total installed capacity of 3,600MW (6 × 600MW). Its total storage capacity is 7.76 billion m3, and with a regulation storage of 4.91 billion m3, it is a storage capacity is 7.76 billion m3, and with a regulation storage of 4.91 billion m3. The project consists of permanent structures categorized as water retaining, spillway and dissipation, and power tunnels and powerhouse complex. Its 305m-high double curvature concrete arch dam is one of the world’s highest dams. Total construction period of the project is 9 years and 3 months, and its total static investment is RMB19.68 billion yuan, while the total dynamic investment is RMB24.58 billion yuan.
Jinping II
Located on the large Jinping River Bend, and is the second of the five cascade projects on the river section from Kala down to the estuary. Jinping-II is designed to cut the 150km river bend by a group of power tunnels to use the natural drop created by the bend. The project primarily consists of a headwork sluice dam, spillway structures, power tunnels and powerhouse complex. The dam is 7.5km downstream of Jinping-I dam. Jinping-II reservoir itself only has a capacity of daily regulation, but when jointly operated with Jinping-I, it also has the capacity of yearly regulation. The 4 power tunnels have an average length of 16.6km and an excavated diameter of 13m, which are among the world’s longest and largest hydraulic tunnels. The powerhouse complex sits underground on the other side of the river bend. The project has a total installed capacity of 4,800MW (8 × 600MW), which gives a multiyear average annual generation of 24.23TWh. Total construction period of the project is 8 years and 3 months, and its total static investment is RMB24.98 billion yuan, while the total dynamic investment is RMB29.77 billion yuan.
Projects in Preparatory Stage
Guandi
Situated 30 km from Xichang City in straight line and 80 km by road. It is the third of the five cascade projects on the river section from Kala to the estuary, and connects with the downstream Ertan Project. The main purpose of Guandi Project is power generation, and its total installed capacity is 2400MW. With the maximum height of the dam being 168m. The reservoir has a total storage of 760 million cubic meters. The complex mainly consists of a RCC (roller compacted concrete) gravity dam, an underground powerhouse on the right bank, and spillway facilities. Its total static investment is RMB12.49 billion yuan, while the total dynamic investment is RMB15.2 billion yuan.
Tongzilin
Situated in Yanbian County of Panzhihua municipality, Sichuan Province, 18km to its upstream Ertan Dam and 15km to the confluence of the Yalong and Jinsha rivers. It is the last cascade project on the Yalong River. The total installed capacity of the project is 600MW (4×150MW). The complex consists of the water-retaining dam sections on both sides, a river-bed type powerhouse, and spillway structures. The maximum dam height is 66.63m, and the length of the dam crest is 468.7m."
Lianghekou
Situated in Yajiang County of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. The project sits where the Yalong merges respectively with the Qingda and Xianshui rivers, hence the name “lianghekou” (meaning “estuary of two rivers”). Because of its particular location with one dam blocking three rivers, and because of its large reservoir, this project is truly a controlling project in the middle and lower reaches of the Yalong. The reservoir, with a regulation storage of 6.33 billion cubic meters, has the capacity of multi-year regulation, and will therefore provide good compensation for all its downstream cascade power stations on the Yalong and even on the Jinsha and Yangtze. The total installed capacity of the project is 3,000MW. The project has favorable development conditions, and will play an important role in improvement of the power source structure of Sichuan power grid, optimization of power source configuration, and fulfillment of the strategy of West-to-East transmission of electric energy. It is a strategic fulfillment of the strategy of West-to-East transmission of electric energy. It is a strategic project for hydroelectric development of the Yalong River and even the whole West, and for coordinated socioeconomic development.
Projects in Investigation Stage
The Ertan website states "The middle reach river section, from Lianghekou to Kala, is 268km long. According to the approved planning, there are six projects in this section of the river, namely Lianghekou (3,000MW), Yagen (1,400MW), Lenggu (2,718MW), Mengdigou (1,840MW), Yangfanggou (1,500MW), and Kala (1,080MW), with a total capacity of approximately 11.54GW. Of these projects, Lianghekou has a large controlling reservoir.
Yagen Hydroelectric Project Yagen Hydroelectric Project is located in Yajiang County of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,400MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 6,368GWh. The expected static investment is about 9.64 billion yuan.
Lenggu Hydroelectric Project Lenggu Hydroelectric Project is located in Kangding and Yajiang counties of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 2,718MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 12,570GWh. The expected static investment is about 22.25 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process.
Mengdigou Hydroelectric Project Mengdigou Hydroelectric Project is located in Jiulong County of Ganzi Prefecture and Muli County of Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,840MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 9,070GWh. The expected static investment is about 12.62 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process.
Yangfanggou Hydroelectric Project Yangfanggou Hydroelectric Project is located in Muli County of Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,500MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 7,05GWh. The expected static investment is about 10.77 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process.
Kala Hydroelectric Project Kala Hydroelectric Project is located in Muli County of Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,080MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 5,24GWh. The expected static investment is about 9.0 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process."
Projects in Planning Stage
The Ertan website states, "The upper reach of the river, from Jiayisi to Lianghekou, is 688km long, and development planning for this section is underway. Based on the investigation data obtained to date, 10 cascade projects with a total installed capacity of 3,250MW are intended to be built, which are Wenbosi (150MW), Renqingling (300MW),Reba (250MW), Ada (250MW), Geni (200MW), Tongha (200MW), Yingda (500MW), Xinlong (500MW), Gongke (400MW), and Gongbagou (500MW)."
Read more on this article...
"Medicinal Herbs"
Saturday, June 13, 2009
I was browsing through Tibetan language blogs, and I came across this brief post by sKar Mig (སྐར་མིག་གི་ཟིན་བྲིས་) expressing concern about the ecological implications of excessive digging of medicinal herbs on the Tibetan Plateau. Over the years, the number of Tibetan families depending on the harvest of herbs, mainlyYartsa Gunbu (དབྱར་རྩ་དགུན་འབུ་ / also known as caterpillar fungus or Cordyceps sinensis), has been growing throughout the TIbetan Plateau, mainly in the south and the east. Daniel Winkler's website has lots of useful information and pictures related to mushrooms of the Tibetan Plateau. I met Daniel Winkler last year at UBC, where he did a presentation on "The Mushrooming Fungi Market on the Tibetan Plateau". I asked him about the ecological sustainability of Yartsa Gumbu, and he did not seem too worried about it because data available to him show that so far both the harvest and growth of cordiceps around the plateau have been favorable.
While there seems to be no systematic study that looks at the question of the ecological sustainability of livelihood based on yartsa gunbu, informed people like Professor Emily Yeh are concerned about the long term social and economic risks associated with excessive reliance on the yartsa gunbu trade. Today a significant proportion of the Tibetan population depend on collection and sale of cordyceps. What if this livelihood becomes impossible for whatever reason (legal bans/ecological/etc/)?
Here are the Image of the original Tibetan blog post and its English translation:
This year again people are digging the ground everywhere on the Tibetan Plateau . Since numerous Tibetans, Chinese as well as Muslims (harvesters) have been digging out the earth to gain medical herbs for decades. If this continues, severe damage in the ecosystem of the region will occur. It is urgent that the Government and the informed people do something to avert such a situation.
Read more on this article...
While there seems to be no systematic study that looks at the question of the ecological sustainability of livelihood based on yartsa gunbu, informed people like Professor Emily Yeh are concerned about the long term social and economic risks associated with excessive reliance on the yartsa gunbu trade. Today a significant proportion of the Tibetan population depend on collection and sale of cordyceps. What if this livelihood becomes impossible for whatever reason (legal bans/ecological/etc/)?
Here are the Image of the original Tibetan blog post and its English translation:
This year again people are digging the ground everywhere on the Tibetan Plateau . Since numerous Tibetans, Chinese as well as Muslims (harvesters) have been digging out the earth to gain medical herbs for decades. If this continues, severe damage in the ecosystem of the region will occur. It is urgent that the Government and the informed people do something to avert such a situation.
Read more on this article...
2 Yunnan dams cancelled for environmental concerns
Xinhua reported on June 11 that the government canceled several projects, including two hydro-electric dam projects in Northern Yunnan. The article, however, does not provide any information about these two dams. Which are these two dams and where are they?
The dams are called Ludila and Longkaikou projects, which are a part of eight dams planned on upper Yangtze (Drichu in Tibetan and Jinsha in Chinese). The eight dams are shown with blue pointers here . Ludila and Longkaikou are the two southernmost dams among the eight. These two dams are about 50 km south of Lijiang (Sartham) as shown in the Google Earth image below.
[end of post]
Do not click on this link: Read more on this article...
The dams are called Ludila and Longkaikou projects, which are a part of eight dams planned on upper Yangtze (Drichu in Tibetan and Jinsha in Chinese). The eight dams are shown with blue pointers here . Ludila and Longkaikou are the two southernmost dams among the eight. These two dams are about 50 km south of Lijiang (Sartham) as shown in the Google Earth image below.
[end of post]
Do not click on this link: Read more on this article...
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